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Abstract
We analyze a dynamic North-South model of innovation, technology transfer, and trade.
Northern firms conduct R&D using labor which has alternative uses producing in the
R&D sector or a nontraded good sector. Since technology transfer prevents the North
from fully appropriating benefits of R&D, the optimal rate of innovation for either profit
maximizing firms or a utility maximizing Northern planner is less than globally optimal.
An increased transfer rate intensifies competition of lower wage Southern workers with
Northern workers in production, so profit maximizing Northern firms (irrespective of
their number or cooperation in R&D) reallocate labor toward R&D.
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1. Introduction
One of the major contributions to the industrial organization literature in the past two
decades has been the treatment of innovation as a type of production process in which resources
must be devoted to R&D in order to develop an innovation.1 It is somewhat surprising, then,
that this aspect of innovative behavior has been largely ignored in theoretical models of
innovation, technology transfer, and international trade (see Feenstra and Judd (1982), Pugel
(1982), Spencer and Brander (1983), Cheng (1984) and Jensen and Thursby (1986) for
exceptions). In this paper we incorporate this notion of R&D into a dynamic North-South trade
model where the pattern of trade is similar to Vernon's (1966) product life cycle. Innovation in
the model is new product development which can be accomplished only by a Northern industry
devoting labor to R&D. Initially this industry has a monopoly position in production of the new
goods, but after some time a lower wage competitive Southern economy learns to produce these
goods so that a product cycle trade pattern emerges.
The Northern industry is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, so that firms develop
new products in order to maximize a discounted stream of positive profits. Development requires
labor input, and the productivity of this input reflects learning-by-doing in product development.
The incentive for firms to devote this input to product development depends both on competition in
the domestic market in the North and, in an open economy, on foreign (Southern) competition. In
this model, foreign firms are incapable of developing new products, but once they learn how to
produce the newly developed Northern products, lower wages allow them to take over the market.
The virtues to this model are that it conforms (albeit loosely) to stylized facts and it allows us to
examine the interaction between the rate at which the technology for producing new products
transfers to. the South and the rate of innovation which is optimal for Northern industry. This is
an important aspect of the product cycle since the transfer of technology to the South is an
example of the well-known appropriability problem in innovation (Arrow (1962)). It has not been
analyzed in most models of the product cycle (Dudley (1974), Krugman (1979), Dollar (1986))
iSee Kamien and Schwartz (1982) for discussion and additional references.
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because, with the exception of Feenstra and Judd (1982) and Jensen and Thursby (1986), the rate
of innovation is not chosen optimally by profit maximizing firms. 2 Moreover, recent studies
examining the impact of cooperative research ventures as a solution to the appropriability problem
have been in a partial equilibrium framework and have abstracted from international aspects of
the problem (Ruff (1969),3 Katz (1984), Spence (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1985), and
Ordover and Willig (1985)). An important feature of our general equilibrium model is the
inclusion of a competitive nontraded good sector in the North. This allows us to examine the effect
of technology transfer not only on R&D, per se, but also on the size of the R&D sector within the
economy.
The major results of the analysis are (1) the profit maximizing rate of innovation for
Northern firms is lower than the rate which is socially optimal for either the North or the world;
(2) the socially optimal rate of innovation from the North's point of view is lower than the rate of
innovation which would maximize world or Southern welfare; and (3) profit maximizing behavior
of Northern firms is associated with an increase in the size of the R&D sector in the North
whenever the rate of technology transfer increases. These results are shown to hold irrespective
of the number of firms in the Northern industry and whether or not these firms cooperate in R&D.
The first two results occur because of the appropriability problem and because the South bears
none of the resource cost of innovation. The South benefits from R&D both in terms of
consumption of products it does not yet know how to produce and in terms of increased income
once it learns the technology to produce new products. The intuition behind the third result is
that, because an increased rate of technology transfer reduces the potential profits from sale of
any given product, firms have an incentive to reduce the amount of production of any given
product. But because consumer's utility (in this as well as other product cycle models) is increased
2Feenstra and Judd incorporate the resource cost of R&D in an optimizing framework, but they
model technology transfer as the sale of technology so that they abstract from appropriability
issues, and their model is static so that they cannot examine how the timing of transfer affects the
Northern industry's choice.
3Ruff's model is general equilibrium, but his economy is closed.
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by greater variety of new products, firms attempt to offset this loss in potential profits by
increasing expenditure on R&D. In this model the latter effect is more important so that the size
of the R&D sector within the economy increases.
A related result of interest is that increased R&D associated with an increased transfer
rate may or may not prevent a deterioration in the Northern terms of trade. In Krugman's
original model, Northern terms of trade deteriorated with an increase in the transfer rate because
the rate of innovation was fixed. Here the rate of innovation increases, and whether or not the
terms of trade decline depends on magnitudes of the production and development effects. Our
inclusion of the nontraded good sector is thus important since these effects depend, in part, on the
opportunity cost of labor in terms of foregone production of the nontraded good. Finally, the
Cournot industry analysis allows us to examine spillover effects within the North.
2. The Basic Model
Assume a world with two economies, called North and South. There are two sectors in
the North, an imperfectly competitive traded good sector which develops and produces new goods
and a perfectly competitive sector which produces a nontraded good. Northern consumers have
identical homothetic preferences over these goods given by
n
UNT= c 1Ct / N ) dy,0< 1UI f 0Y~i <y< N nt N' (1)
where UN is Northern utility, n is the number of traded goods available for consumption, cN(77) is
the amount of the tth traded good consumed, and cnt is consumption of the nontraded good. (1) is
increasing in the number of traded goods (for given income and prices), and 1/(1--y) is the
elasticity of substitution among traded goods. The equation differs from those of Krugman,
Feenstra and Judd, Dollar, and Jensen and Thursby by the inclusion of the nontraded good, which
allows us to examine the resource cost of developing a new good not only in terms of foregone
consumption of other R&D-related goods, but also in terms of another type of good. The form of
(1) implies an elasticity of substitution between a traded and nontraded good of unity, and it
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guarantees that with free trade production in the North will be incompletely specialized. The
South is perfectly competitive, and its consumers have identical, homothetic preferences given by
n
U = / c(r7)&dr. 0<-Y<1
0 (2)
where US is Southern utility.
Labor is the only factor used to develop and produce traded goods. In order to focus on
technologically related trade, we assume a worker in either country can produce one unit of any
traded good, assuming the technology for producing it is known by the worker. The essential
difference between the two is that only Northern workers can develop new goods, where new
goods are defined as newly developed traded goods whose production technology is known only in
the North. Old goods are those traded goods whose production technology is common knowledge.
Initially all traded goods are old goods. If development occurs, then the stocks of new and old
goods are determined over time by the rates of innovation and technology transfer. Innovation
refers to the development of new goods and technology transfer to the South learning the
technology required to produce new goods. No technical change in the form of increased
productivity in production occurs in either the traded or nontraded good sectors. The nontraded
good is produced by labor and a fixed factor (e.g. land). 4(Lnt) denotes output of the nontraded
good as a function of labor, where c(0)=0, 0'> 0, and 4" <0 because of the fixed factor. These
assumptions allow us to incorporate wage effects of hiring decisions in the R&D sector.
In this section we assume a monopolist in the R&D sector. This allows us to focus on the
appropriability problem between the two countries without the complication of possible spillover
effects of R&D within the North. Those effects will be considered in Section 4 where we assume a
Cournot oligopoly in the North. In the simpler case of monopoly, the innovation process is given
by
i(t) = h[Dm(t)]n(t), n(0) = n0 > 0
(3)
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where a dot over a variable indicates a derivative with respect to time t, Dm(t) is the number of
workers used by the monopolist in R&D at t, and the function h is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, satisfy h(0) =0, h'>0> h", and be bounded above by the social rate of
discount, r. Three characteristics of this specification merit discussion. First, it models innovation
as a production process in which the output is the instantaneous rate of increase in new goods and
the inputs are labor in R&D and the current total number of traded goods. The marginal products
of both inputs are positive, with that of labor decreasing and that of the total number of traded
goods constant. It is impossible to develop any new goods without devoting some resources to
R&D. Given that some labor is put into R&D, innovation is proportional to the number of traded
goods currently in existence. Recalling that only the North develops new goods, this says that the
more new goods have been developed, the more new goods can be developed at any given date by
a fixed supply of Northern workers. This characteristic of our specification of innovation simply
assumes there is learning-by-doing in the development of new goods.4 Finally, we also assume
that innovation cannot be too rapid in the sense that the rate of growth of the total number of
traded goods (h = ni/n) cannot exceed the social rate of discount in the North. This assumption is
needed to insure the convergence and existence of the objective functionals examined.
Once the monopolist has developed and exported new goods, the process by which the
South learns the technology required to produce these goods is given by
ng(t) = vnN(t), ng(0) = n0  (4)
where v is a constant fraction and nN is the number of Northern goods exported. This
specification is used by Krugman (1979) and can be justified in terms of "reverse engineering,"
where Southern workers eventually learn how to produce imported goods by dismantling and
studying them. This type of process has been shown to account for a substantial amount of
technology transfer (Mansfield and Romeo (1980) and Mansfield, et al. (1982)). It seems
4See Arrow (1962) and Fellner (1969) and references therein for discussion of learning by doing
in production processes.
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reasonable that the more new goods there are, the greater the South's opportunity, and thus its
ability, to learn to produce new goods through reverse engineering. Since (4) implies that the
number of goods which the South learns to produce at any date is positively related to the number
of goods available to them, it can be viewed as a formalization of the process of reverse
engineering. One could argue that the transfer rate should be endogenized, but doing so would
unnecessarily complicate the model and obscure comparative dynamics results. Jensen and
Thursby (1986) endogenize the rate of transfer in a simpler model with only traded goods and a
Northern monopolist. Dollar (1986) also endogenizes the rate of transfer in a competitive model
with only traded goods by arbitrarily assuming that it is a function of the relative wage.
The form of the utility functions and the unitary marginal product of labor in producing
traded goods insure that all goods produced by the monopolist sell at the same price, PN and all
Southern goods sell at the same price, PS. Perfect competition and full employment in the South
insure PS=wS where w 5 is the wage of a Southern worker. Full employment in the North and
perfect competition in the nontraded good sector imply the supply of labor facing the monopolist
can be written as wN(D +LM)=4'(MN-Dm-Lm) where wN is the Northern wage, MN is the
amount of labor in the North, Lm is the amount of labor employed by the monopolist in
production, ¢' is the marginal product of labor in producing the nontraded good, and the price of
the nontraded good is set to one. Finally, we assume wN'= -o">0, so that if new product
development and trade occur, the terms of trade P=P N fS, will exceed the relative wage,
w=wN /wS
Following Krugman we assume w> 1, so that as soon as the South learns the technology
to produce a traded good it steals the monopolist's market. Hence the number of traded goods
produced by the North is the number of new goods, nNn-nS, and the number of goods produced
by the South is the number of old goods, n5 . The balance of payments in addition to our other
assumptions imply that the terms of trade and wage can be written as




where MS is amount of Southern labor and 6 is the ratio of new to old goods, nN/nS. (5) differs
from Krugman and Dollar's expressions for the terms of trade because it takes into account the
fact that the development of new goods requires the use of workers who must be taken out of
current production of other goods. (6) is derived in the Appendix and differs from wage
expressions in the existing literature because of the imperfect competition in the R&D (traded
good) sector and the fact that Northern labor has alternative uses in producing nontraded as well
as traded goods.
The monopolist's profit per period is
= PL - w(L +D) (7)
2c
- rt
and its problem is to choose L (t) and D (t) for all t to maximize f e r(t)dt subject to the
m m 0 m
innovation process (3), the technology transfer process (4), and L =M -D -L . The current
nt N m m
value Hamiltonian (see Section 8 of Part I of Kamien and Schwartz (1981) for a definition and
discussion) is
H =r + A h(D )n+pvm m m m +A ) m+ mN (8)
and the first order necessary conditions are
&7r /BL = 0
m m (9)
(87r /OD ) +A h'(D )n = 0m m m m (10)
\ =rA -(B~r /an)-h(D )A - p vm m m mm m (11)
A = rpm /- Irn 5) + v(12)
and the usual transversality conditions (again see Kamien and Schwartz). Since the necessary
conditions for this problem are not informative, we confine our analysis to the steady state.
Differentiating xr with respect to L shows that the necessary condition for choice ofm m
Lm in the steady state is (9) written as
8
'-1l
yP - 'P#¢ 1(L +D )- w[1+6(L +D )] = 0m m m m (131
where 6=(4'/4)-(¢"/4')>0 and ¢', , ,and 6 are evaluated at L =M -D -L .
nt N m m
We must have Am=0 and pm=0 in a steady state, which with (11) and (12) implies
A =F(7r /n) + (--) (7r /n)l /[r - h(D )]. Substituting this into (10) and computing allm ~m r +v m Sj m
relevant derivatives (using (5), (6), and (7)) shows that the necessary condition for optimal choice
of Dm in the steady state can be written as
' -1
(1-y)h'(D )(1+6){rPL [1-¢4¢-1(L +D )]-v67r }
m m m m m
-w[1+6(L +D )] + = 0
m m (r+v)6[r-h(D )]in (14)
where, again, ¢', 4 , and 6 are evaluated at L = MN -D -L
nt N m m
Dividing (13) by P and (14) by PLm simplifies the necessary conditions to
L -1 -1
H (L ,D ) = y[1-th'd (L +D )] - L 4'C [1+6(L +D )] = 0
m m m m m m m m'(15)
(1--y)h'(D )(1+8)
D m -1 -1
H (L ,D ) =[1-4'4 (L +D )] -4'4 [1+6(L +D )] = 0.
m m m r+v)6 m m m m 16)
L
The condition H (L ,D ) = 0 has the standard interpretation that the Northern monopolist hires
m m' m
workers to produce new goods up to the point where the marginal revenue product of the last one
D
hired is equal to the marginal expense of labor in production. The condition H (L D ) = 0 saysmm' m
to hire workers for R&D up to the point where the increase in the present discounted value of the
stream of future profits from the last one hired is equal to the marginal expense of labor in R&D.
To ensure that the marginal expense of labor in the production or development of new goods is
increasing in L or D , we shall assume 96IaD 0 and 86/9L 0 throughout.
m m
Proposition 1: Under our assumptions there xists a unique and stable steady state equilibrium
*
characterized by a positive rate of Northern innovation, h(Dm), a positive ratio of new to old
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goods, 6 = h(Dm)/v, and positive amounts of both traded and nontraded goods produced by the
* L(* )*
North, L and #(M -D -L ), where D and L are defined by H (L D )0 and
m N m m m m m m' m
H (L D )=0.
m m' m
Proof: Since (13) and (14) (and hence (15) and (16)) depend on t only through Dm, Lm, and 6, we
must show that constant D and L imply constant 6 in order to prove that a steady state canm m
exist (i.e., that (13) and (14) can be written as autonomous equations). However, since
O=(1 +6)[h(D ) - v6], it follows that 6=0 if and only if 6= h(D )/v, which is constant whenever
m m
* * -1
D is. To prove that L +D <M , note that - 11'(MT-D -L )- (M -- D -L
m m m N' m m N m m
approaches -oo as L +D approaches MN while the remaining terms in (13) and (14) are finite.
m m N\
To prove Lm>0, note that P approaches + oc as Lm approaches 0, so the left hand side of (13)
approaches + oo as L approaches 0 for any D <MN. To show D >0, multiply (14) by 6 and
m -m Nm
note that the left hand side of this new equation is positive as Dm approaches 0 as long as
h'(0)>0. This plus the continuity of (13) and (14) prove the existence of L and D such that
m m
(13) and (14) hold simultaneously. In order to do comparative dynamics, we shall assume that the
L D
matrix of second partial derivatives of H and H is negative definite, which also ensures the
m m
* *
uniqueness and local stability of (L ,Dm '
Implicit in equations (14) and (16) is the fact that in the steady state the ratio of new to
* *
old goods, 6m, must be the constant h(D )/v. Accordingly the steady state values of the rate of
innovation, employment and output in each sector in the North, the terms of trade, and the
relative wage will be constant. The utility functions insure that the nontraded good sector in the
North does not vanish. The additional assumption of no threshold effects in R&D (h'(0) >0)
insures that new goods are developed and produced in the steady state.
Note that (15) depends on L and D , but not 6. Solving (15) for L (D ) andm m m m
substituting into (16) allows us to depict the steady state in Dm-6 space. In Figure 1, the function
6= h(Dm)Iv shows all combinations of Dm and 6 such that 6=(1 +6)[h(Dm) -v6] =0, while the
function 6= g(D ) show combinations of D and 6 such that HD (L ,D ) =0. The intersection ofm m m m'm
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these two determine the steady state values of D and 9 = h(D )/v, and the arrows indicate them m m
path by which D and 6 return to the steady state if there is a marginal displacement from it.m
To compare D and L to the socially optimal allocation from the North's perspective,
consider the problem of a Northern planner who chooses labor in development D(t) and labor in
production of new goods L(t) to maximize the present value of Northern utility. The planner will
allocate L/nN workers to the production of each new good since the demand and cost conditions for
oN
each new good are the same. In particular, D(t) and L(t) are chosen to maximize fe- rN(t)dt
0
subject to (3) and (4) where UN is given by (1) evaluated at cnt = S1 N - D - L), cN( N) =UaL/nN,
cN( aS)=aM nS, PL/(PL+Ms), and P=[nNM/nL]I~. Following the same procedure used
to determine the steady state for the monopoly, we find the planner's steady state is characterized
by L*>0, D*>0, L*+D*<MN, and 6*=h(D*)/v. Now L* and D* are implicitly defined by
H (L*,D*)=0 and HN(L*,D*)=0 where
L -1
H N (LD) = [1-(1- 7)(1- a)]/ --',N' (17)
D (1-'y)h'(D)(1+6) -1
HN(L,D) = [r-(1- y)(1-a)(r-h(D))]-4'?
y(r + v)6[r - h(D)] (18)
and 6=h(D)/v. Multiplying these by PL shows that in the planner's steady state optimum D* and
L* satisfy
P[1-(1-y)(1-a)] - w* = 0 (19)
(1- y)h'(D*)(1+6*)
PL* [r-(1-y)(1- a)(r-h(D*))] - w* = 0
v(r +v)6*[r- h(D*)] (20)
where w*=PL*4'(M -D*-L*)4~ (MN-D*-L*). Hence the planner allocates workers to the
traded goods sector up to the point where the marginal contribution to the present value of
Northern utility of the last worker in development and in production of new goods equals the wage
w. From (13) and (14) recall that the monopolist hires workers up to the point where the
marginal contribution to the present value of profit of the last workers in development or
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production of new goods equals the marginal expense of labor w + w6(L + D)> w. The essential
difference is that the Northern planner will not exploit labor at all, and, in addition, will take into
account utility from traded goods even after technology is transferred and they are old goods.
Since the firm does not gain after technology transfer, it follows that it will hire fewer workers for
both development and production. That is, assuming the matrix of second partial derivatives of
D L
HN and HNis negative definite (so a unique maximum exists and comparative dynamics can be
done) it follows that D*> D and L* > L
m m
Since Southern consumers get no utility from Northern nontraded goods, a Southern
planner would allocate Northern workers to the development and production of new goods up to
the point where the marginal contribution to the present value of Southern utility of the last
worker in each activity are equal (i.e., all MN workers are allocated between development and
production of new goods such that the contribution at the margin is equal in both activities).
Hence D* and L* must be lower than those which maximize Southern utility. A global planner
whose objective is to maximize a weighted average of Northern and Southern utility will then
choose D and L less than those the South prefers, but greater than those which maximize
Northern utility or the monopolist's profit. Since Southerners bear none of the cost of R&D, they
will prefer a higher rate of innovation than either a Northern planner or monopolist would choose.
Alternatively put, given the inability to fully appropriate the benefits from its R&D, any Northern
agent will underinnovate from a world point of view.
These results for the Northern and Southern planners prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Under our assumptions
(i) from both the North's and South's perspectives, the profit maximizing monopolist will
innovate less than is socially optimal; and
(ii) the optimal rate of innovation from the North's perspective is lower than the rate
which would maximize world or Southern utility.
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3. Acceleration in Technology Transfer
Like other models of the product life cycle, this model predicts a trade pattern in constant
flux. The North develops new goods and exports them until the technique for producing them
becomes common knowledge, at which point it imports them from the South. The North's absolute
advantage in developing new goods allows w> 1; but the transfer of technology dictates that to
maintain this wage, the North must continually innovate. In such a world it is natural for the
North to be concerned when the South's ability to learn the new technology improves. For a
constant rate of innovation, it is clear that the Northern wage and terms of trade decline with an
exogenous increase in the rate of transfer (Krugman (1979), Dollar (1986)). The question the
current model allows us to address is what happens to the profit maximizing rate of innovation
when the transfer rate increases. In addition, the inclusion of the nontraded good sector allows us
to examine the effect of an increased transfer rate on the size of the R&D (traded good) sector
within the North.
Proposition 3: An increase in the transfer rate increases the steady state employment of labor in
R&D and the rate of innovation. Employment of labor in production of new traded goods
decreases, nonetheless total employment in the R&D sector increases. The effects on the ratio of
new to old goods, the terms of trade, the wage, and the rate of innovation which is socially optimal
for the North are ambiguous.
*
To see the effect of an accelerated transfer rate on D recall that an increase in v affects
m
the monopolist's discounted future profits in two ways: it reduces the profitability of the last
worker in R&D through (r+v) in (16), and it increases it through the term (1+6)/6 in (16). As
shown in the Appendix, the latter effect outweighs the former, so that Dm increases. The
resulting increase in the marginal expense of labor in production of traded goods leads to a
*
decrease in L , but this reduction is not enough to outweigh increased employment in R&D
because direct effects outweigh indirect effects in this firm model. A Northern planner maximizing
utility has the option of offsetting any reduction in utility caused by an increase in v by moving
13
resources into the nontraded good sector. This extra degree of freedom not available to the profit
maximizing monopolist leads to the ambiguous effect of a change in v on the socially optimal rate
of innovation.5
The ambiguous effect of an increase in v on 6m is most easily seen with reference to
Figure 1. The increase in v shifts both the 0=0 and g(-) schedules to the right so that we know
D increases, but without knowing the magnitudes of the two shifts we cannot tell whether 6m m
increases or decreases. This ambiguity raises the possibility that the Northern terms of trade
may not decrease with an increased transfer rate in a model with endogenous innovation.
Recalling (5) and the fact that OLm/6v< 0, the North's terms of trade must increase whenever 6m
does not decrease. If 6 decreases, a sufficient condition for P to increase is that the elasticity of
the demand for labor in production of traded goods with respect to the transfer rate be greater
than the elasticity of the new to old good ratio with respect to the transfer rate (i.e.,
- (v/L )(BL /y)> - (v/6 )(86 /av)). Finally, the increase in D and the decline in L implym m m m m m
that any decline in P will be less than the decline predicted with a fixed rate of innovation.
4. A Cournot Traded Good Industry
Given the vast R&D literature devoted to the effects of market structure on the rate of
innovation and the popularity of oligopoly models in international trade,6 it is natural to ask how
firm rivalry within the North would affect new product development, technology transfer, and
trade. In this section we assume there are an arbitrary number K of firms, each of which
develops its own line of new traded goods. The goods in the product line of a given firm are
differentiated from those of any other firm, but all traded goods are assumed to enter the utility
5Jensen and Thursby (1985) show that with full employment, no nontraded good, and a CES
utility function, a utility maximizing planner would increase the allocation of labor to R&D with an
increase in v.
6 0n market structure and innovation see Kamnien and Schwartz (1982) and references therein;
for oligopoly in international trade see Spencer and Brander (1983) and Dixit (1984).
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function of a representative consumer in the same fashion. Letting k index both the firms and
their product lines, the utility function of every Northern consumer is now
K nk
U =c t f cN (7k)ydk]N nt k=1 0 (21)
and that of each Southern consumer is
K nk
U = E / c(77)d77k
S k=10 (22)
The fundamental properties of these utility functions are the same as those used in the analysis of
a Northern monopoly. There are two reasons for allowing each firm to develop its own product
line. One is that it loosely corresponds to the realistic notion that a firm would rather develop its
own goods over which it has monopoly power than develop exactly the same goods its competitors
do. The other is that it avoids certain nondifferentiability problems that would arise if the firms
tried to develop the same new goods at different rates.'
Although the firms are developing different product lines, it is plausible that their R&D
efforts are interrelated by an unavoidable transmission of information. For example, workers
may exchange experience or ideas at formal or informal gatherings or even move between firms.
This transmission of information is a spillover effect of R&D which seems quite common in
practice. One natural way to model this spillover effect is to specify the "effective" development
effort of a given firm as a function of its own development and that of its competitors. We define
the effective research effort of firm k at time t as
Ek(t) = Dk(t) + E Okj ((t)
j k (23)
where Dk(t) is the number of workers hired by firm k for R&D and O3kj is the spillover coefficient
determining the extent to which the research conducted by firm j enhances the level of
71f firms try to develop the same new goods, then each firm's profit as a function of the number
of goods it can produce will be nondifferentiable at the point where it takes a lead over other firms
(i.e. at the maximum number of goods all other firms can produce).
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development actually attained by k (where kjE[O,1] for all kj). The actual rate of innovation for
firm k is then
fnk(t) = h[Ek(t)]nk(t), nk(0) = n0 ' (24)
This specification therefore allows for different rates of innovation and different product lines
among firms.
Now the ability of the South to learn how to produce new goods may vary among product
lines since the goods in one firm's line may be easier to reverse engineer than those in another
firm's line. Thus we specify the technology transfer process for a given product line k as
nSk(t) = vk[nk(t)-nSk(t)], nSk(0) = n0  (25)
where vkE(0,1) is the transfer rate for line k. Hence, even if the rate of innovation is the same for
all product lines, different transfer rates can lead to different new-to-old good ratios
ek(t) = nNk(t)/nSk(t) for each k, where nNk(t) = nk(t) - nSk(t).
Given any vector of old goods (nS ,.,nSk), the fraction of all old goods which belong to
K
line k is nSk/ .E n~ and so the total production of old goods in line k in the South is
j= 1
K
nSkMS/ . En.. Total Southern production of any one old good in line k is thus
J=1
K K K
(nSkM / E n. nSk = M / E n., which is the same for all k (i.e., MS/ E n is the amount of
j=1 j=1SJ=1
any old good produced in the South). If Lk is the amount of labor hired by firm k to produce the
nNk new goods in its line, then Lk/nNk is the amount produced of each new good in its line. The
relative price (terms of trade) for each new good in line k is therefore
K K
Pk= [(M1 / E nS.)/(Lk/nNk)]I~ = [nNkMSLk. E ]
j=1 j=1 (26)
K K
Letting D = E Dk and L = E Lk it then follows from full employment in the North and
k=1 k=1 k
perfect competition in the nontraded goods sector that the relative wage of a Northern worker is
now
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K -1w = ( E PkLk) 0 (MN- D -L)P' (MN -D -L).
k=1 (27)
The easiest way to see this is to recall (6) and note that now total revenue from the sale of all new
K
goods is L PkLk'
k=1
The profit per period of firm k is then
k= PkLk-w(Lk+Dk) (28)
and - rtand its problem is to choose Lk(t) and Dk(t) for all t to maximize re rk(t)dt subject to the
0
innovation process (24) and the technology transfer process (25). We confine our analysis to the
steady state Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies, primarily to insure the analysis is tractable.
The general specification of this industry model not only allows for asymmetric equilibria, but also
makes them more likely than a symmetric equilibrium. Nevertheless, we can provide conditions
sufficient to ensure that the equilibrium is symmetric. This is particularly useful since it allows us
to provide comparative dynamics results. Before doing so, however, it is worthwhile to note
several necessary conditions which any steady state equilibrium must satisfy.
As before, existence of a steady state requires that 8k= (1 + Gk)[h(Ek) - vk6k] =0 for all k.
K
However, it is now also necessary that the ratio ak(t) = nNk(t)/ E ns.(t) also be constant in the
j=1
K
steady state (recall the expression for Pk) Since &k^ k kk~. E vj a], it follows that
J=1J
K
h(Ek) =vk0k =E v.a. for all k is necessary in a steady state in which all K firms operate. Since
j=1
K
the term E v.o. is the same for every k, we must have h(Ekvk0k=h(Ei)=v i for any firms i
j=1JJ
and k in such a steady state. This proves the following result.
Proposition 4: If there exists a steady state Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies in which all
firms operate, then it is necessary that the effective research effort of every firm is the same and
the rate of innovation in every product line is the same.
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The intuition for this result comes from observing that Pk is a function of
K
k= nNk'.E n5.. Suppose that the rate of innovation of firm 1 is greater than that of any 
other
j=1
firm. Due to technology transfer, this implies that the number of old goods of line 1 will
eventually become large enough to drive Lk to 0 for all k 1. This drives Pk toward 0 for k 1
and forces these other firms out of the new goods market.
The description of the steady state equilibrium is completed by specifying the optimal
choices of labor in the production of new goods, Lk, and in R&D, Dk, for each firm. Using
standard techniques these choices can be shown to require choosing L and D to satisfy
H (L ,D)=O and Hk (L,D)=0 where
L -1Hk (Lk,Dk) k Y k 4 )'(Lk +Dk) - w[ 1+ 6(Lk+Dk (29)
- 1'
(1- )h'(Ek)(1+86k){rPkLk[1 - Q (Lk+Dk) -vkckk}
H (Lk,Dk)
[r - h(Ek)](r + vk)&k
- w[1+6(Lk+Dk)l. (30)
Equations (29) and (30) are interpreted for an oligopolist as (15) and (16) for the monopolist.
To see that employment of firms can differ in the steady state consider a duopoly (K=2)
example. If v 1 =v2=V, then n5 1 =nS2 as well as n1=n2, so we must have 89 =2 and6 1=a2'
However, since E1=E2 implies D1=(1-312)D2 /21), we have D1=D2 if and only if
012 =21. Suppose instead 0<312 <021< 1, so firm 2 gains more from spillovers in R and D than
firm 1. Then it is necessary that D 1 >D 2, or 1 must hire more workers for R&D to attain the
same effective research effort as 2. In fact, if 312=0 and 821=1, then E 1 =E 2 >0 requires that
D2= 0 and E =E2=D >0. If 2 can learn everything about l's R&D but 1 learns nothing from
2, then 2 can free ride completely on l's R&D. Now suppose #312/321<1 but v1>vM2 . Then
E1=EF2 implies D1=D2 , but v1 >v2 implies n5 1>nS2 and so 61<02 and oe <02. Suppose L2
and D2 stfy H2 (L2 ,D2) =H2 (L2 ,D2) =0. Since 01< 02, we must have
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1 ( LS<2 <(Ms/L 2 )~ which implies H (L2D)=H (L2D)<0. Because 8H /6Lk<0,S22S21' 2' 112' 2 k k '
this implies H (L 1,D )=0 if and only if L <L2. If 1's product line is more susceptible to reverse1 1 1 2
engineering, then it has monopoly power over fewer new goods than 2 and therefore produces less
(hires fewer workers to produce its new goods).
Proposition 5. If transfer rates are identical but spillovers are not, then it is necessary in a steady
state equilibrium that the firm which gains the least from spillovers also hire the most workers for
R&D. If spillovers are identical but transfer rates are not, then it is necessary that the firm
whose product line is the most susceptible to reverse engineering also hires the fewest workers for
production.
5. Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium and Comparative Steady States
The preceding analysis shows that if the transfer rates and spillovers are identical (vk = v
and 3kj.<1), then for every firm k and j we must have Ek=E , Dk=D , nk=n , NSk =njk J' k J'  J'SkJn.,
06, jand ak =a.. Given these results, it follows that the only way the equations H (LkDk) =0
and H (Lk,Dk) =0 can hold simultaneously for all k is if L =L for all firms k and j. That is, the
steady state equilibrium must be symmetric.
Proposition 6. If the transfer rates and spillovers among firms are identical, then the steady state
* * *
equilibrium exists and must be symmetric. That is, for every firm k, Dk = D, Lk=L' 6 6c
* * * * * * * * *
and k =a where 6 =h(E )/v, E =[1+3(K-1)]D , a =6 /K, and D and L satisfyk c c c c c c c c c
* * L * *D * *
0<K(L +D )<M , H (L ,D )=0, and H (L ,D )=0 where
c c N' c c c c c c
L -1 -1
H (L ,D) = 7[1-#'# (L +D )]-KL 4'# [1+6(L +D )]c c'c c c c c c(31)
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(1-y)h'(E )(1+6 ) Kr -h(E )
H (L ,D) = - (L +D) -
ec'c"(r+v)6 K(r-h(E )) e e
c c
-1
Kc'#b [1+6(L +D )].
e c (32)
If the matrix of second derivatives of H and H with respect to L and D is negative definite (as
c C C c
we shall assume hereafter), then this symmetric equilibrium is unique and locally stable.
Northern terms of trade in this steady state is P =(a- M /LI) = (6 M /KL
c c S c c S c
Proposition 7. In the symmetric steady state equilibrium the oligopoly hires more workers for
production of new goods than a monopoly, but its rate of innovation may be higher or lower than
that in monopoly. The oligopoly hires fewer workers for both production and development of new
goods, and has a lower rate of innovation than is socially optimal from either the Northern or
global point of view.
As for the monopolist, each oligopolist's choice of Le does not depend directly on 6c, v, or
MS, so that in the steady state the choice of labor in production is a static one. Hence, as in a
standard static model, the oligopoly hires more workers (and produces more) than does the
monopolist because the monopolist is better at exploiting its market power in the labor market.
Naturally the same effect tends to make the oligopoly hire more workers for R&D as well.
However, since the oligopoly exerts less market power in the new product market as well, and so
has less to gain from new product development than a monopoly, it may or may not hire more
workers for R&D. Moreover, even if we knew it hired more workers, this would not guarantee a
higher rate of innovation because the effective rate of research effort is less than total
employment in R&D whenever spillovers are not complete (i< 1). Welfare results follow the same
reasoning as in Proposition 2.
Final results for the symmetric oligopoly deal with how the steady state varies with
changes in the parameters.
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Proposition 8. An increase in the transfer rate increases labor in R&D and the rate of innovation,
reduces labor in production of new goods, and increases the size of the traded goods sector. If
diminishing marginal productivity in R&D is substantial, then an increase in spillovers reduces
labor in R&D, increases labor in production of new goods, and decreases the size of the traded
goods sector.
The intuition for the effect of an increase in v is the same as for the monopolist. Since 8
L
does not enter Hc, the effects of a change in this common spillover coefficient are similar to those
D
for the transfer rate. If H is increasing in ,3, then an increase in spillovers increases labor in
c
R&D and the rate of innovation, reduces labor in production, but increases the size of the traded
goods sector. A sufficient condition for this is h" =0 and r/2s< h(E )s -(K -1)r6 (which is less
D
likely the smaller the number of firms). Conversely, if H decreases with ,, then an increase inc
spillovers in R&D reduces labor in R&D and the rate of innovation, increases labor in production,
but reduces the size of the traded goods sector. A sufficient condition for this is substantial
diminishing marginal productivity of labor in R&D (h" large in absolute value).
6. Cooperative Research Lab
Given the existence of spillovers in R&D, it is natural to ask whether or not allowing the
oligopolists to form a cooperative research lab can benefit the firms and/or the Northern
consumers. Questions of the formation and effects of such labs have been studied by Ruff (1969),
Katz (1984), Spence (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1985), and Ordover and Willig (1985).
However, all of these have been in a partial equilibrium framework or have abstracted from
international aspects of the problem. In this model of product cycle trade, there is an
appropriability problem both within the Northern economy due to spillovers and between the
Northern and Southern economies due to technology transfer. Hence the analysis in this
subsection contributes to the literature on cooperative research ventures by examining their
impact in a general equilibrium model of product cycle trade when there are spillovers in R&D
both between the Northern firms and between the Northern and Southern economies.
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We maintain the assumption that spillovers among the firms and transfer rates are
identical. Consider allowing the firms to form a cooperative lab in which all share equally in both
the costs and the benefits of the lab. Then the profit of each firm is
7 =PkLk - w[Lk + (E1 /K)]
where E is the jointly chosen level of employment in the lab. The rate of innovation of each firm
is now nk(t)=h[E(t)]nk(t) for every k. Each firm's problem is then to choose Lk(t) and E1 (t) to
00
- rt
maximize f e -r(t)dt subject to the innovation and technology transfer processes.
0
Proposition 9. If spillovers and transfer rates are equal, then all firms forming a cooperative
research lab in which they share equally in both its costs and benefits is a Nash equilibrium (in
open-loop strategies). The resulting steady state rate of innovation and total employment in the
production of new traded goods are higher than those in a monopoly or symmetric oligopoly
without a lab, but lower than those which maximize Northern and global welfare. An increase in
the transfer rate has the same qualitative effects as in the monopoly or symmetric oligopoly.
Formation of the lab improves the welfare of both Northern and Southern consumers by
increasing the rate of innovation and production of new traded goods closer to the levels which are
socially optimal. The reasons for these increases are essentially the same as those which explain
why the firms form a lab. Formation of the lab increases firm profit in two ways. First, it allows
the firms to collude in the choice of labor in R&D, thereby improving their ability to exploit labor
and reducing the marginal expense of labor in R&D. Second, it internalizes the spillover
externalities in the lab, thus increasing the effective level of R&D, the rate of innovation, the ratio
of new-to-old goods, and the terms of trade. Conversely, the formation of the lab is a Nash
equilibrium because a firm that drops out of the lab must suffer a decrease in profit. Consumers
also gain from the lab because the reduction in the marginal expense of labor in R&D ensures that
production of new traded goods increases as well as the rate of innovation.8 However, because
8This tends to lower the terms of trade and so partially offset the increase from an increased rate
of innovation. Katz finds a similar result in his partial equilibrium static model.
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the firms still exploit labor and ignore the effect of old goods on utility, the rate of innovation and
production of new goods are still less than those which maximize utility. The rationale for the
effects of a change in the transfer rate is the same as in the case of monopoly.
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed several variants of a dynamic model of innovation, technology
transfer, and international trade. The analysis extends previous work by endogenizing the rate of
innovation in a model where profit maximizing firms must devote resources to R&D in order to
innovate and these resources have alternative uses in production within the R&D sector or in a
competitive nontraded good sector. In doing so we combine well known results from the R&D
literature (i.e. learning by doing and spillover effects) with the trade structure of the Krugman-
Vernon product life cycle. The transfer of technology inherent in the cycle prevents the Northern
industry from fully appropriating the benefits of its R&D so that the rate innovation is lower than
the globally optimal rate. Nonetheless, with an acceleration in the transfer rate, the optimal
response of the Northern industry is to increase its product development. This occurs because the
North has a comparative disadvantage in producing traded goods. An increase in v accentuates
this disadvantage so that Southern workers displace Northern workers in producing traded goods
to a greater extent. With this intensified competition from Southern labor in production, the North
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Appendix
Derivation of the Terms of Trade and Relative Wage
In the presence of both new and old goods, the utility of a Northern consumer becomes
n S n
UN= ct cNrS)dryS + n cN7N) d7Nl(Al
nt 0 I S S ng
- - (A1l)




IN =nt + J p(7S)cN(77S)dS + / MP(N)cN(rN)dnN
0 nS (A2)
where IN is Northern nominal income, p(nN) is the nominal price of new good qN' p(s) is the
nominal price of old good og, and the price of a nontraded good is one. Necessary conditions for
utility maximization imply
p(N E = [cN(?7S)/cN(7N 1(A3)
nS n
1/p(r) }= cN(7S) 1 jf cN(77S)2drS f+/ cN(7N)'dj c1
S S 0 ITTS S N N N n
- (A4)
~ nS n
1/p(nN) = cN ( N)1 '7/c S o N 77N Ncnt1
01 n
N [(A5)
Solving (A4) or (A5) for cnt and substituting from (A3) gives
nS n
cn =f(?S)cN(77S)dnS + f pgtN)cN(7?N)d?7N, so from (A2) we have IN= 2cn (i.e., Northernnt0 n5 N n
consumers divide their income equally between traded and nontraded goods). Note that, because
utility is homothetic, the proportion of income spent on traded and nontraded goods is independent
of the distribution of income among factor owners. Necessary conditions for maximization of
Southern utility imply
p(nN S)= [cS(rS)/cS(N) (A6)
Therefore the demand functions for each new good are all identical and those for each old good are
identical. Given the assumptions on production, it follows that a Northern monopolist will produce
the same amount of each new good and the South will produce the same amount of each old good,
so that the nominal price of each new good is the same and the nominal price of each old good is
the same.
If L is total labor in production of new goods in the North (and also total production of all
new goods), then cN(?7N)+cS(N)=L/nN and cN(17S)+cS(77S)=MS/nS. Total nominal income in the
North is therefore IN=cnt+nNp(17N)L/nN= 2 p(7N)L and that in the South is IS-p(-g)MS. Using
the fact that cN(77N) = cS(?7N)IN/2 IS and cN(gS) = cS(7S)IN/2 IS (derived from comparing Northern
and Southern demand functions), it follows that the share a of total production of any new good or
any old good which is consumed in the North is
a = IN/N+2IS) = p(N)L/[p(nN)L+MS]. (A7)
Therefore cN( N) = aL/nN and cNGUS) = aM5 /nS, and so the terms of trade between any new good
and any old good given by (A3) becomes
p ( S) = [nNMS/nL] 1--V (A)
which is the same as (5) in the text since Pap(7N)P(iS)
Now let 4 be the production function for nontraded goods and Lnt be the amount of labor
in the nontraded good sector. Then (A4) becomes
1/p&a5 ) = a{M5 +(N/nS) 1  -L~ 1]/4(Lnt) (A9)
which after substitution of (A7) and (A8) becomes
=/~g [-(?7nNP 2S)]L/#5(LntI' (Al0)




which is equivalent to (6) in the text.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
The effect of a change in v on Lm and Dm is found by totally differentiating
HL (L .D )0O and HM(L ,D)=O0 with respect to L , D , and v. Since (OHL /0%) =0. it
mm'mmm m m m
follows that
OD /Ov = - ((OHL IOL ) (OHD/Ov))/IHI
m m m m I
(DL Jay) = ((OH /OD ) (OHD /Ov))/IH~
m m m m f
(OD J'ay) + (O9L /Ov)0 = (OHD /Ov) (HL /OD ) - (OHL /(L ))!IH~m m m m m m m
whereIH = (OHLIOL )(OHD IOD )-(OHL ID ) (OHD /OL ) > 0.
m m m m m m m
Since O /Ov =(l-)[rh(D )])v6)[1-'1l- +D)] (L +D )]/v> v)0m m m m m m
=H(l-aL h'(D- )[r-(D-)][l-q+6(L +D )]/rv)0>,m m m m
OH-OL L -v-1[6 +q -q / l+)(L +D )]<0
m m m m '
(aHL/aD -L q - 1 -'(OIO L - +)] K 0, <
m'm mm
and, since 06/OL =0610D ,(OHL IOD ) - (OHL JOL ) _ -1 [1+6(L +D )] > 0, we havemn, n m' m m m m m m '
A T "A \ w_* T "A \ * T .* "A _ w A T 7 T T
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and only if -(aL /&v)v/L = -(80 /6v)v/6 . Since the wage depends on 6 and P*, the effect of a
m m< m m m
change in v on it is also ambiguous.
Proofs of remaining propositions are straightforward and are available from the
authors upon request.
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C. Proof of Propositions 3, 4, and 5
Using the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 1, one can show that the terms of
trade of any new good in line k relative to any old good is given by (15) and that the relative wage
is given by (16). The current value Hamiltonian for firm k is
Hk =k + kh(Ek)nk + kvknNk
and the first order necessary conditions are
Brk/BLk (A21)
(ak/aDk) +Xkh'(Ek)nk = 0 A22)
)k = rAk-(a k/dnk)-h(Ek))Ak-kv (A23)
k = rk(ak/anSk)+kv A24)
and the usual transversality conditions. To determine whether or not a steady state can exist, set
Ak =0 in (A24) and ak=0 in (A23), solve these for Ak, and substitute this into (A22). Taking
derivatives and collecting terms then gives (19) in the text. Computing the derivative in (A21)
gives (18). These equations depend on t only through Lk, Ek, 9k, and ok, all of which must be
constant if there is a steady state. If Lk and Dk are constants for all firms, then we need only
show that this implies 8k= 0 and &k=0 for all k to show a steady state can exist. However, as
noted in the text 8k= 0 if and only if h(Ek)vkk and &=0 if and only if v =vk6k for all k.
Therefore h(Ek)=vk k= _X 1 v for all k is necessary in any steady state in which all K firms
survive. This proves Proposition 3 since the summation term does not depend on k. Proposition 4
is essentially proved in the text.
To prove Proposition 5, first note that vk=v for all k implies that h(Ek)=v~k '=Sl.vcr
for all k is necessary in the steady state, so 9k=h(Ek)/v for all k. Since E=E for all k and j is
also necessary, it follows that n=n n~ =nj andnk n for all kand jand forall t.
Therefore ok~~"j for all k and j and all t. I fl #k= < 1 for all k and j also, then Ek =E. implies
Dk=D. for all k and j as well in the steady state. Hence, if we consider the necessary conditions
(18) and (19) for two different firms k and j, the only possible difference between these pairs of
V
L
equations is the value of L and L.. Suppose that L. <Lk. Then since Hk is decreasing in Lk, it
k jJ k k k
follows that H (Lk,Dk)=0 if and only if H (L.,Dk)>0. Therefore (18) and (19) can be satisfied
simultaneously for all k if and only if Lk=L for all k and j. This proves that when vk=v for all k
and Skj =3< 1 for all k and j, the steady state equilibrium must be symmetric if it exists. The
proof of the existence of symmetric equilibrium which is interior is essentially the same as that for
the monopoly. To show that the necessary conditions (18) and (19) become (20) and (21) in the
symmetric steady state, first note that nNk=nNj and nSk = n for all k and j imply that ak =c
and hence 6 =6 =Kc , for all firms k. Substituting L =L , D =D, 6 =6, and e =6 /k into
k c c k ce k c'k c' k c
1 -i-
(18) and (19) and then dividing (18) by P =[6 M S/KL c] and (19) by P L gives (20) and (21).
c c S c ece
D. Proof of Proposition 6
Given identical transfer rates, the levels D* and L* which maximize the present value of
Northern utility when there are K product lines are again given by (A19') and (A20'), although
now L* is the total amount of labor in the production of all new goods (i.e., production in each
* *
product line is L*/K). Since w* evaluated at L* =KL and D* =DK is less than
c c
* * * * *
w [1+6(L +D ] from (18) or (19), it follows that KL <L* and KD <D*. Since
c c c c
L * * D * *




E. Proof of Proposition 7
L * * D * *
Totally differentiating H (L,Dc)=0 and He (Lc,Dc) = 0 shows
c cc c c cc
OD /v = -((OHL/b )(OHD/Iv))/jH
c c c c c
* * D FL - L 1
(BDc /Ov) +(bc /&v) = (OH /v~) [(OH /OD) )(OHc /BLc~ )/HI
vi
where = (OHL/OL )(OHD/OD ) -(aHL/OD )(OHDIOL )>0. Since
(1-i-)h' (Ec)[r - h(E )1 Kr -h(E )
OH0 /Ov = [*-q~q (L +D) > 0,
CaC
v(r+v) 8 K[r-h(E )]
c c
OH iO/L = - (-vK6 --v$'q- -K&' )- [1 +6(L +D I
--1(1qq5 [b + (O/OL )(L +D ) < 0,
OH /OD = -- vK6-v5'6$-KL c'q -[6+ (O5/OD )(L" +D )],C c c c c c'
(OH /OD ) - (OH /OL) = cKc c c [1+6(L c+ D )]>0 (where c' and b are evaluated at
MS - KDc ), it follows that (ODc 1Ov) >0 > (Lc l ac) and O(Lc +D C)IaKv> 0.
Following the same procedure for /3,
OD /a;3 = - ((OHL/OL)(OHI /O,3)/IHI
OL /0i)3 = - ((OH IOD)(OHD/O9/3))/IHJ
(ODe 10/) + (0L /0/3$) = (H/)[(OHLj/OD ) -k(±±L/uLJ/IHcI.
D '* c cc*c* cD
Hence, (OH /aO)> 0 implies (OD /009 > 0 > (OL 1/3a) and O(L + D )/O,3> 0 while (OHD1/3) < 0 implies
(aDc /0/3) < 0< (aLc /0/3) and O(L + D C)/O/3< 0. The statement concerning /3 in the Proposition then
follows from observing that OHD/0a3=c
(1-)~(K -1)D [ 211 (h)(1 +6B)(K-1)2rD
hc 1+ (hl) F Kr-h - l1Y('
vii
D*
(BH /a3)>0 if Kr(2h-r)+h[(K-1) r-h]>0, which holds if hr/2 and hs(K-1)6 r. Also note
D
that (6H /a3)>0 at K= 1 (since the second term vanishes).c
F. Proof of Proposition 8
The current value Hamiltonian for a firm when there is a cooperative lab is
H ='l + Ah(E1)n + ,lvnN
since nk = n and nSk=nS for all k. First order necessary conditions are
r /OL = 0
(8"I/aE 1) + A h'(E1)n = 0
A = rA -(09r/an) - h(E) A1 -V
y= ry 1 -(B /nS +yv
and the usual transversality conditions. Using these as before, one can show that necessary
conditions for a steady state equilibrium are E1 = E1 , Lk = L1 for all k, 6l = h(E1 )/v, and o-=91 /K,
L **E *
where L and E are defined by H1 (L1 ,E )=0 and H1 (L1 ,E )=0 and
L -1 -1
H (L ,E) = [1-'4 (L +(E /K))] - KL 4'q [1+6(L +(E /K))]11 1 1 1 1 1 (A24)
(1-y)h'(E)(1+6) Kr- h(E1)
H1 (L 1,E) = [ -' (L+(E/K)).
(r+v)61  K[r -h(E)] (A25)
The derivation of 6l , o , (A24), and (A25) and the proof that Lk=L1 for all k is entirely
analogous to that for the symmetric oligopoly.
Let f(L,E) =4'(MN- L -E)~ I(MN -L -E)(L +(ElK)) and g(L,E) =f(L,E)6(MN-L -E)
(i.e., 6 evaluated at MN -L - E). Then (af/aE)>0 and (cBg/aE)> 0. Notice that total employment in
* *L
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